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E. P. O'MALLEY, as Secretary, LOCAL 128, OIL WORK-

ERS INTERNATIONAL UNION, CIO, Respondent, v.
PETROLEUM MAIN'rENANCE COMPANY (a Limited
Partnership) et al., Appellants.
[la, lb] Labor-Collective Bargaining Contracts-Arbitration.A company which entered into a collective bargaining contract with a union is bound by a submission agreement signed
by it and the union, submitting to arbitration the questions
whether the company's discharge of a union member was
arbitrable and whether such discharge was proper, despite
the fact that the trial court, in ordering arbitration, merely
ordered arbitration of the merits of the member's discharge.
[2] Arbitration-Powers of Arbitrator.-The powers of an arbitrator are limited and circumscribed by the agreement or stipulation of submission.
[3] Id.-Award-Finality.-A party may not agree to arbitrate
a question and then, if the decision goes against him, litigate
the question in another proceeding, even though the submission agreement may provide that the parties are not to be
deemed "to have waived any rights given them by law."
[4] Id.-Award-Conclusiveness.-Arbitrators do not exceed their
powers merely because they assign an erroneous reason for
their decision.
[5] Labor-Collective Bargaining Contracts-Arbitration.-Any
controversy under a collective bargaining contract which requires first a determination that the contract does or does not
define the rights or duties of the parties in an existing situation
is subject to arbitration if the agreement provides for arbitration of disputes that arise out of the contract.
[6] Arbitration-Award-Court Review.-The merits of a controversy between the parties to an arbitration are not subject
to judicial review.
[7] Labor-Collective Bargaining Contracts-Arbitration.-In a
proceeding to confirm an arbitration award, the court did not
err in refusing to receive in evidence two exhibits offered by
one party which tended to show that, despite the submission
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Arbitration and Award, § 19 et seq.; Labor,
§ 133; Am.Jur., Arbitration and Award, § 83 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 5, 7] Labor, § 3a; [2] Arbitration,
§ 18; [3] Arbitration, § 26; [ 4] Arbitration, § 30; [6] Arbitration,
§ 37.1.
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agreement, it did not intend tho arbitrability of the question
to be decided by tho arbitrators, the award having been within
the issues submitted.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County confirming an arbitration award. Beach
Vasey, Judge. Affirmed.
Madden & McCarry for Appellants.
Wirin, Rissman & Okrand and Fred Okrand for Respondent.
CARTER, J.-This is an appeal by Petroleum Maintenance Company (hereinafter referred to as "Company")
from a judgment of the superior court confirming an arbitration award in favor of Oil vVorkers International Union, CIO,
!Jocal128 (hereinafter referred to as "Union").
On July 16, 1947, the Company entered into a collective
bargaining agreement with the Union. On October 5, 1951,
Company discharged one Frank J. Semmett, a member of
Local 128. On April 10, 1952, the Union filed a petition for
an order directing arbitration of Semmett's discharge. On
June 20, 1952, the trial court granted the petition and ordered
the matter arbitrated. Company appealed from the order,
but the District Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal (Corbett
v. Petrolettrn JJia:intenance Co., 119 Cal.App.2d 21 [258 P.2d
1077]) on the ground that section 1293 of the Code of Civil
Procedure was controlling and that section did not provide
for an appeal from an order directing arbitration.
The Union's petition to the superior court was for either
arbitration of the grievance of Semmett, or arbitration of
the question whether the Semmett discharge was subject to
arbitration. The superior court ordered only arbitration of
the merits of the discharge.
Union and Company on January 22, 1954, entered into a
submission agreement and pursuant thereto three arbitrators
were selected. The submission agreement, signed by both
Company and Union, provided that the parties agreed to
s1.1bmit to arbitration (1) whether the discharge of Semmett
was arbitrable and (2) whether the discharge of Semmett was
proper. Paragraph ( 4) of the submission agreement provides
that "In submitting this matter to arbitration neither party
shaJl be deemed to have waived any rights given them by
law." Company at all times contended that the discharge of
Semmett was not subject to arbitration.
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The collective bargaining agreement does not specifically
mention the discharge of any employee. 'l'he agreement provides for a union shop, deductions from wages for union
dues, strikes and lockouts, hours of work, holidays, transportation, contract work as related to subcontracts let by Company, meals, safety, clothing allowance, classification of work,
and grievance procedure.* It also provides under the article
entitled "Seniority" for promotions, layoffs, and rehiring.
Vacations, illness, accidents, insurance, overtime, and wages
and leaves of absence, assignability of the agreement and
notices under it are also provided for.
Article XI, entitled ''GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE" provides:
'' Por the purpose of handling disputes arising over the performance of this Agreement, there will be committeemen
Plected by the Union members for the various departments or
t~rafts. These committeemen will be recognized by the Company in the first stPp of adjusting such a complaint, which
will be with the man involved, his foreman, and the committeemen for such group or any other committeemen.
''If they cannot settle the dispute, then it shall be reduced
to writing and a committee of five ( 5) shall meet with a representative of the Company to try to settle the dispute. The
committeemen shall have fifteen (15) days to investigate such
complaint after they are aware of their occurrence. The
Company shall have seven (7) days to reply to the Committee. If the reply does not meet with the committee's approval,
they may ask the Union to discuss the dispute with a representative of the Company and try to reach settlement, if, in
the opinion of Union officials, the dispute warrants such meeting. This meeting to be held within fifteen (15) days after
Company's reply to committee. If an Agreement cannot be
reached the Company and Union shall select a third party to
sit with a Company official as a Board of Arbitration with a
decision of any two to be binding on the Company and the
Union. The expense of such a third party shall be borne
equally by the company and the Union."
Union contends that the discharge of Semmett was arbitrable in that the collective bargaining agreement impliedly
provides only for discharge upon a proper showing of cause
for such discharge. Company, on the other hand, contends
that nothing in the agreement relates to the discharge of
any employee. Union also argues that Company by its conduct
*This article will be set forth in full.
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in taking the first two steps under the grievance procedure
up until the point of arbitration recognized that discharge
was a proper subject for arbitration under the collective bargaining agreement and is now estopped to claim that the
arbitration procedure does not apply. It is also argued by
Union that Company, having submitted the arbitrability of the
discharge to the arbitration committee, when the court order
did not require such arbitration, has waived its right to
object to the arbitrability of the question.
The three arbitrators concurred in holding that the dispute
was not arbitrable under the collective bargaining agreement
and that they would have declined jurisdiction had it not been
for the order of the court requiring arbitration on the merits.
A majority of the arbitrators then concluded that Semmett
had been improperly discharged and ordered his reinstatement with full seniority rights as of the date of his discharge and ''made whole for all wages which he would have
earned from July 8, 1952, less any wages received from any
other source and any unemployment compansation. ''
[la] We are of the opinion that Company is bound by
the terms of the submission to arbitration agreement.
[2] It is the rule that "The powers of an arbitrator are
limited and circumscribed by the agreement or stipulation of
submission (Bierlein v. Johnson, 73 Cal.App.2d 728, 733
[166 P.2d 644])." (Pacific Fire etc. Btfreatt v. Bookbinders'
etc. Union, 115 Cal.App.2d 111, 114 [251 P.2d 694].) (See
also Stenzor v. Leon, 130 Cal.App.2d 729, 732 [279 P.2d 802] ;
Flores v. Barman, 130 Cal.App.2d 282, 286 [279 P.2d 81] ;
Crofoot v. Blair Holdings Corp., 119 Cal.App.2d 156, 186,
187 [260 P.2d 156] ; 30 Cal.Jur.2d, § 133, p. 84.) [lb] In
the case at bar, although the trial court merely ordered arbitration of the merits of Semmett's discharge, Company agreed,
in the submission agreement to the arbitration of the two
questions: Whether Semmett's discharge was arbitrable and
to the arbitration of the discharge of Semmett. This it was
not bound to do since the arbitrability of the question could
have been considered after the judgment confirming the arbitrator's award on the merits of the controversy. (Sjoberg v.
Hastorf, 33 Cal.2d 116, 118, 119 [199 P.2d 668].) [3] With
respect to Company's argument that it had specifically provided that it was not to be deemed ''to have waived any
rights given them by law" it appears that Company may not
agree to arbitrate a question and then, if the decision goes
against it, litigate the question in another proceeding. In
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v. Blair Holdings Corp., 119 Cal.App.2d 156, 186,
187 [260 P.2d 156], the court had much the same problem
under consideration. It was there held: "'l'he whole spirit
of the agreement is that these parties, when the agreement
was executed, wanted to settle the many court actions then
pending between them, carefully selected a competent and
impartial arbitrator, and were then content, so long as the
arbitrator acted within the limitations of the arbitration
statute, to accept his determination as final, both as to law
and facts. Now that such determinations have not turned
out as this appellant hoped, he is attempting to secure a
complete reconsideration of many legal (and some factual)
determinations in this court. Under his agreement and the
provisions of the law, except where permitted to do so by statute, this he cannot do." It was then said that "If the
arbitrator in fact created causes of action not within the
arbitration agreement, and then decided these unsubmitted
issu<:>s, that would require a vacation of the award as being
in excess of the arbitrator's powers within the meaning of
section 1288 of the Code of Civil Procedure." As we have
heretofore pointed out the arbitrators in the case at bar
decided the issues submitted to them by the parties.
[4] It is of course well settled that arbitrators do not
exceed their powers merely because they assign an erroneous
reason for their decision. (Southside Theatres, Inc. v. Moving
P. etc. Local, 131 Cal.App.2d 798, 803 [281 P.2d 31] ; McKay
v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 110 Cal.App.2d 672 [243 P.2d 35] ;
Crofoot v. Blair Holdings Corp., 119 Cal.App.2d 156, 189
[260 P.2d 156] .) [5] In Southside Theatres, Inc. v. Moving
P. etc. Local, S1lpra, pages 802, 803, the court said: ''Any
controversy under a collective bargaining contract which
requires first a determination that the contract does or does
not define the rights or duties of the parties in an existing
situation is subject to arbitration if the agreement provides
for the arbitration of disputes that arise out of the contract.
"The foundational questions are : vVb at was submitted to
the arbitrators and what did they decide~" The arbitrators
here decided that the controversy was arbitrable and that
Semmett 's discharge was improper. [6] The merits of the
controversy between the parties are not subject to judicial
review (Pacific Vegetable Oil Corp. v. C. 8. T., Ltd., 29 Cal.2d
228, 233 [174 P.2d 441]; Sapp v. Barenfeld, 34 Cal.2d 515,
523 [212 P.2d 233] ; Crofoot v. Blair Holclings Corp., 119
Cal.App.2d 156, 185 [260 P.2d 156]; Myers v. Richfield Oil

112

0 'MALLEY v. PETROLEUM MAINTENANCE Co.

[48 C.2d

Corp., 98 Cal.App.2d 667, 671 [220 P.2d 973] ; Riley v. Pig'n
Whistle Candy Co., 109 Cal.App.2d 650, 651 [241 P.2d 294]).
[7] The trial court did not err in refusing to receive
in evidence two exhibits offered by Company. These exhibits
tended to show that despite the submission agreement, Company did not intend the arbitrability of the question to be
decided by the arbitrators. We have heretofore discussed the
effect of the submission agreement which defined the seope of
the arbitrators' powers and that the award made by the
arbitrators was elearly within the issues submitted to them.
The judgment confirming the award is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and Traynor, J., eoneurred.
SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.-In my opinion, on any fair
view of the reeord before us, the arbitrators did not deeide
against the eompany, but rather refused to deeide at all, the
question whether the diseharge of an employe was an arbitrable matter. As stated in the majority opinion (ante, p.
108), the original petition of the union to the superior court
"was for either arbitration of the grievance of Semmett,
or arbitration of the question whether the Semmett discharge
was subject to arbitration. The superior court [on July 8,
1952] ordered only arbitration of the merits of the discharge.''
The company throughout these proceedings has consistently
taken the position that the question of discharge was not an
arbitrable matter under the collective bargaining agreement
between the company and the union. The original appeal of the
company from the order directing arbitration was dismissed by
the District Court of Appeal of its own motion, in Corbett v.
Petroleum Maintenance Co. (1953), 119 Cal.App.2d 21, 22
[258 P.2d 1077], on the ground that the order directing arbitration was not appealable. But as the District Court of
Appeal points out, the company's ground of appeal was that
"the [collective bargaining] agreement is silent as to any
restrietion upon the employer's right to diseharge and, therefore, the matter of the discharge of the employee is not within the scope of the agreed arbitration procedure.''
After dismissal of this former appeal, the company and
the union in writing ''submit [ted] to arbitration . . . the
following dispute:
"(1) . . . Company, the Employer, asserts that the matter
of the discharge of an employee is not subject to arbitration.
. . . Union, . . . representing the Employee, Frank Scm-
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rnett, asserts that the matter of the discharge of an employee
is subject to arbitration. The Union asserts that its position
has been upheld by the Superior Court [by the above mentioned order of July 8, 1952] . . .
'' (2) The Company asserts that if the matter of discharge
is subject to arbitration, the discharge of Frank Semmett,
the employee, was proper. The Union asserts that the discharge was improper . . .
" ( 4) In submitting this matter to arbitration neither party
shall be deemed to have waived any rights given them by
Iaw." 1
The majority of the arbitrators, in their opinion filed after
the arbitration hearing, announced that they believed that
they were bound by the superior court order of July 8, 1952,
based on the ''conclusion of law that a question of discharge
is arbitrable and is within the grievance procedure of the
[collective bargaining] agreement between the parties"; the
majority opinion of the arbitrators further set out in detail
the reasons why the majority would have determined that the
question was not arbitrable had they believed that such question was open.
The opinion of the dissenting arbitrator states, "It is axiomatic that arbitration can be compelled only where parties
have agreed to this method of settling disputes, and then only
to the extent provided. The discharge in question was therefore not subject to arbitration and, in my view, the decision
of the Superior Court to the contrary is erroneous.
"The majority eoncurs in this conelusion. It, however,
holds that the Superior Court judgment is nevertheless binding upon this Board. The majority states that absent such
judgment, it would hold the dispute not to be arbitrable.
The anomalous position in which this places the majority is
well shown by the result in this case. The very factors which
1
A transcript of the proceedings before the arbitrators, lodged with
this court, shows that, at the beginning of the hearing before the
arbitrators, counsel for the company and also counsel for the union made
clear their position that they were submitting to the arbitrators the
question whether the right to discharge was arbitrable. Counsel for the
company took the position that under the collective bargaining agreement there was no provision for arbitration concerning discharges, and
on this ground claimed that the arbitrators had no "jurisdiction."
Counsel for the company appears mistnkcn in his claim that the arbitrators were without ''jurisdiction'' to determine arbitrability, for thnt
question had been expressly submitted to the arbitrators, but be was
correct in his position that the question whether discharge was an
arbitrable issue was open.
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go into the question of arbitrability are the ones upon which
the decision upon the merits must be based. Thus, it is eonceded that the collective bargaining agreement only provides
for the arbitration of disputes concerning the performance
of the agreement and that therefore disputes concerning
discharges are not arbitrable. Yet, assuming arbitrability,
the Company's action can only be upset if it is in violation
of the agreement. But it cannot be in violation of the agreement since there is no limitation upon the right to discharge;
if there were the matter would be arbitrable. But the majority says it is not arbitrable, and to be consistent it would
have to hold that for the same reasons the Company's action
was not in violation of the agreement. However, it has not
done so.''
The award of the arbitrators decides that the superior court
order of July 8, 1952, "renders this dispute arbitrable" and
that "Semmett shall be reinstated."
When the union moved the superior court to confirm the
arbitrator's award, the company, although it did not move
to vacate the award, took the position by its answer to the
union's application for confirmation that "the arbitrators
were without jurisdiction and had no authority to make the
award herein sought to be enforced for the reasons that [the
collective bargaining agreement] . . . contains no restrictions
or limitations on the defendants' [company's] right to discharge an employee. That the Arbitrators exceeded their
powers in making the award . . . ''
In my opinion there was presented to the superior court by
the foregoing allegations of the company's answer (perhaps
ineptly but with sufficient certainty to make necessary a ruling thereon) the following question of law: Have the arbitrators ''exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed
them, that a mutual, final and definite award, upon the subject matter submitted, was not made"~ (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1288, par. (d), which requires vacation of an award in the
quoted situation.) In my further opinion, the arbitrators
did imperfectly execute their powers because they made it
clear (by their majority opinion and award) that they thought
that because of the superior court order of July 8, 1952, the
question of the arbitrability of discharges, although it had
been submitted to them, was not properly before them and
that they were bound to rule that such question was arbitrable. In fact, the question of arbitrability was before the

Mar.

0

':MALLEY

v.

PETROLEUM :lVIAIN'rENANCE

Co.

115

[48 C.2d 107; 308 P.2d 9]

arbitrators and their refusal to decide it was an imperfect
exercise of their powers and duties.
Here the arbitrators did not, as the majority opinion of
this court states, decide the question of arbitrability against
the company; rather, upon a reasonable interpretation of the
record, they refused to decide that question in the erroneous
belief that it was not open. I recognize and accept the rule,
quoted in the majority opinion from Pacific Fire etc. Bureau
v. Bookbinders' etc. Union (1952), 115 Cal.App.2d 111, 114
[251 P.2d 694], that "The powers of an arbitrator are limited
and circumscribed by the agreement or stipulation of submission.'' But when the arbitrators refuse to decide a question submitted to them, it seems to me that they are improperly and insufficiently exercising their powers and duties.
The end result of affirmance of the present superior court
judgment which confirms the arbitrators' award is that the
company, despite all its attempts to keep the matter open,
has never had an opportunity either to litigate on appeal or
to arbitrate the question determined against it by the original
superior court conclusion of law that "a question of discharge
is arbitrable.''
For the reasons above stated, I would reverse the order confirming the award.
Spence, J., and :McComb, J., concurred.
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied April 10,
1957. Schauer, J., Spence, J., and McComb, J., were of the
opinion that the petition should be granted.

